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INTRODUCTION
Soon after our Constitution took effect, James Madison
called the President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws the
“essence” of the office.1 A century later, even the rather
undistinguished President Benjamin Harrison could see that it
was the “central idea” of the office.2 But what does the duty
mean? At a rudimentary level of separation of powers theory,
* Professor Harold H. Bruff is the Rosenbaum Professor of Law at the
University of Colorado Law School.
1. ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JAMES MADISON, LETTERS OF PACIFICUS AND
HELVIDIUS ON THE PROCLAMATION OF NEUTRALITY OF 1793, at 61 (1845). For the
Neutrality Crisis from which this letter sprang, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Story
of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling Over Presidential Power Outside the
Courts, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 21 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis
A. Bradley eds., 2009).
2. BENJAMIN HARRISON, THIS COUNTRY OF OURS 98 (1897). See generally
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY, ch. 9 (2013).
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every American middle schooler should know that Congress
makes the laws, the courts interpret them, and the President
executes them.3 This simple construct ignores the richness and
complexity of the duty as the forty-four Presidents of the
United States have interpreted it. This Article seeks to flesh
out the concept.
The text of the Constitution contains two separate but
linked provisions to ensure that Presidents will accept and
abide their faithful execution duty. First, at the moment of
assuming office, each President takes the Constitution’s
prescribed oath to “faithfully execute the Office of President”
and to “preserve, protect, and defend” the Constitution.4 The
oath-taking has an indelible effect on every President—they
often refer to it—occurring as it does either in front of the
nation at the Capitol or somewhere else immediately after the
shocking news of a predecessor’s death.5 Second, as Article II
finishes enumerating the various powers of the President, it
abjures him or her to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”6 At first glance, this may seem mere repetition for
emphasis, and that purpose may well be present. More
importantly, the clause in Article II extends the President’s
responsibility beyond the conduct of his or her own office to a
more general accountability for the actions of the subordinate
3. Alas, in 2014 only 18% of eighth grade students performed at or above the
Proficient level in U.S. history and 23% performed at or above the Proficient level
in civics. New Results Show Eighth-Graders’ Knowledge of U.S. History,
Geography, and Civics, NATION’S REPORT CARD, http://www.nations
reportcard.gov/hgc_2014/# [https://perma.cc/H3EW-VMUC]. Only 7% of eighth
grade students were able to identify the powers of the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches and demonstrate complete knowledge of the checks and balances
among the branches. 2014 Civics Assessment: Question 228, NATION’S REPORT
CARD, http://www.nationsreportcard.gov/hgc_2014/#/civics/question/228 [https://
perma.cc/9AK2-4DTX]; see also Sam Dillon, Failing Grades on Civics Exam Called
a “Crisis,” N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/
education/05civics.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/ED6V-P4TG].
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
5. Oath-taking has a long history as a way to impose obligations. For
example, in 1199 King John of England took a coronation oath “to observe peace
[and to honor God] . . . ; to do good justice and equity to the people entrusted to his
care; to keep good laws and destroy any bad laws and evil customs that had been
introduced into the land.” DANNY DANZIGER & JOHN GILLINGHAM, 1215: THE
YEAR OF MAGNA CARTA 141 (2003). Had King John better adhered to the oath, he
might have avoided making the promises later extracted from him in the form of
Magna Carta.
6. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
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executive officers who will perform most administrative
actions. It also stands as a warning, given the impeachment
provision that occurs a few words later on.7
This Article offers a framework for understanding the
faithful execution duty that is drawn from the way our
Presidents have understood and implemented it.8 They have
indeed treated it as “central” and “essential” to their concept of
the office.9 They know it provides a main standard against
which their performance will be measured by voters and
posterity. Certainly their understanding of the content of the
duty has varied widely over the last two and a quarter
centuries since Washington first took the oath in 1789. Even
so, enough common threads appear in the historical record to
allow us to see what the duty has come to include.
It has been clear for a long time that the principal limit to
presidential discretion under the duty is what “We the People”
who govern under the Constitution and our representatives in
Congress will accept politically at a particular time. Thus the
duty is reciprocal: presidential behavior offers an ongoing
interpretation of the office, and it behooves all of us to pay
sufficient critical attention to ensure that the behavior is
faithful in the full constitutional sense. Recall Benjamin
Franklin’s admonition at the close of the Constitutional
Convention to a woman who asked what the framers had
wrought: “A republic, if you can keep it.”10
To appraise how We and our Presidents are doing at the
task of keeping the Republic, I invite readers to ask five
questions about performance of the faithful execution duty.

7. Hence the resignation of Richard Nixon in the face of near-certain
impeachment and removal for grievously failing his duties has probably braced
his successors somewhat to their own obligations.
8. For a full exploration of these issues, see HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN
GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION (2015) [hereinafter
UNTRODDEN GROUND]. See also Martin S. Flaherty, Harold Bruff, Untrodden
Ground: America’s Evolutionary Presidency, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 881 (2015)
(book review).
9. Faithful execution is a central theme of UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note
8. Particular passages that are relevant to discussion in this Article are cited
below.
10. EARL WARREN, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 11 (1972).
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IN WHOSE HANDS?

Our current President, Barack Obama, once observed that
conventional legal materials can supply most of the ingredients
of constitutional interpretation, but that the critical last step to
making a decision depends on what is in the interpreter’s
“heart.”11 By this he meant that all hard interpretive decisions
are ultimately personal in nature. Past the point where legal
guidance runs out, decisions reflect at least five major
ingredients: the President’s personality (which is a blend of
character and experience), his or her political values, the
incentives that the presidency creates, the nature of the
controversy or crisis at hand, and the President’s awareness of
how a proposed action fits against the precedents created by
prior Presidents. Summing up these various influences may
allow predictions about presidential actions with some degree
of confidence, but plainly a range of choice, and perhaps a wide
one, is always present.
To see how much the personal element of interpretation
matters, consider two pairs of Presidents. James Buchanan, a
weak man, took a weak view of his faithful execution duty in
the secession crisis of 1861.12 Although he believed secession
was unconstitutional, he claimed he had no power to take
vigorous action against seceding states. His successor, the
immeasurably stronger Abraham Lincoln, read his powers
broadly enough to allow him to save the Union after conducting
a great civil war. Half a century later, the temperamentally
aggressive Theodore Roosevelt took an expansive view of his
powers, interpreting them to allow him to do anything not
forbidden by the Constitution and statutes.13 His more cautious
and lawyerly successor, William Howard Taft, thought he could
take only actions for which affirmative authority could be
found.
What constrains the range of interpretation? Presidents
weighing the imponderables of faithful execution have paid
close attention to what their predecessors have done, because
11. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 427.
12. See id. at ch. 5 (for Buchanan and Lincoln). Buchanan’s weakest
successor, Warren Harding, once abjured “personal government, individual,
dictatorial, autocratic, or what not.” Id. at 224. Plainly, Harding was not seeking
to expand the powers of the office.
13. See id. at ch. 7 (for Roosevelt and Taft).
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no one else has faced this unique responsibility. Presidents
have instinctively understood that the duty involves the
practical operation of an evolving government. Hence they have
shown little interest in original intent theories of what the
framers expected that the duty might entail for a government
not yet in being.14 Similarly, the episodic musings of the less
informed judiciary, whose experience is in a separate branch,
tend not to interest Presidents much unless they prove useful
to quote in debate.15 As presidential precedents accumulate,
the result is a common law of the presidency, which encourages
incumbents to find links to what has gone before and not to
stray too far onto untrodden ground. Stability promotes
acceptability.
Presidents ordinarily possess a gestalt view of the
Constitution as a whole, as their oath implies they should do,
instead of an approach tied closely to weaving together
particular provisions. Compare Jefferson’s view of a restrained
federal government relying on power mostly left with the states
with Lincoln’s view of an indissoluble nation having
constitutional powers adequate to pursue national ends. Thus a
President’s politics at the most general level will inform his
decisions, which then translates presidential values into the
legal operation of the executive branch. Presidents who have
reconstructed American politics (and the presidency along with
it) have usually reached back to invoke primal values they
associate with the nation’s founding. For example, Ronald
Reagan claimed a “great rediscovery” of values of liberty that
had been present in the Jeffersonian tradition from the earliest
days.16 Lincoln drew the values of liberty and equality that he
crystallized in the Gettysburg Address from the Declaration of
Independence rather than the more compromised text of the
Constitution. Thus Presidents claim legitimacy by tying new
departures to old values in the process of leaving their personal
stamp on American history.

14. For an explanation and endorsement of originalism for judges, see
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
15. Presidents do, however, ordinarily respect the holdings of the courts in
particular cases, which is clearly part of their constitutional obligation.
16. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 360.
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II. WHO/WHOM?
This famous question was Lenin’s charming way of asking
about the results of political change on the ground: who was
going to do what to whom?17 At the apex of a more forgiving
polity than the one Lenin commanded, American Presidents
have still favored some groups over others in executing the law.
Here lies an irreducible tension between the President’s role as
head of state, which is implicit in the Constitution, and his or
her role as head of a political party, which is ignored in the
Constitution.
Of course, since about the time of Andrew Jackson,
Presidents have routinely claimed to be tribunes of the whole
people, but that is emphatically not how they have behaved.
Jackson himself favored small property owners over the rich,
whites over blacks, and almost everyone over the Indians.18
Consider whether a given President has aided management or
labor when a disruptive strike occurs. Gilded Age Presidents
favored the railroads over their workers; for example, Grover
Cleveland went to extremes in breaking the Pullman strike
late in the nineteenth century.19 But then Theodore Roosevelt
brought the interests of workers into the mix as he mediated a
coal strike, saying he wanted a “square deal” for all.20 Harry
Truman was so devoted to labor that he unsuccessfully seized
the steel mills in an effort to get workers a raise.21 At times
presidential motivation is complex—Ronald Reagan broke an
illegal air controller’s strike by firing the workers, saying he
was protecting the traveling public, but his action did also
appeal to a conservative base that disliked unions.22
Presidents who have reconstructed American politics—
such as Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and
Reagan—have sharply shifted the who/whom relations they
found upon taking office. Thus, like earthquakes, Presidents
raise or lower the ground and frequently cause injuries. Even
17. See generally Michael J. Beloff, Who – Whom? Unresolved Issues in
Judicial Review, 20 DENNING L.J. 35 (2008).
18. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at ch. 4.
19. Id. at 189–90.
20. Id. at 199.
21. See generally MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE:
THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977).
22. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 530 n.15.
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the least seismic presidencies alter the landscape somewhat,
perhaps enduringly.23
As Presidents have alternated between conservative or
liberal politics over the years, one might expect most groups in
American society to have been favored at some times and
disfavored at others, and for many of us that would be true.
There have been, however, two kinds of groups that have
consistently suffered neglect or outright hostility from
Presidents. One of them, sadly, is the downtrodden—the poor,
powerless racial minorities (blacks and Indians especially), and
women (at least until they won the vote in 1920). Only
Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson have shown sustained
attention to alleviating poverty. Yet FDR revealed great
insensitivity to a vulnerable population when he interned
Japanese Americans in World War II.24 Several Presidents,
including Grover Cleveland and Herbert Hoover, have denied
that the federal government has any power to aid the poor.25
Many Presidents have, however, tried to alleviate the
tribulations of the rich.
Of course, the composition of the coalitions that elect and
support Presidents explains much of this disappointing
pattern. Presidents normally respond to elite groups that
either support them or can cause trouble by opposing them in
Congress, not to those at the fringes of society. We can only
wish that widely held and well-justified theories that
Presidents possess a “protective” power to come to the aid of
citizens in distress were more often buttressed by examples of
Presidents rushing to the aid of those who need it most.26
Political dissenters have also suffered under presidential
execution of the law.27 Presidents are naturally hostile to
anyone objecting to what they are doing. Perhaps we should
forgive suppression of dissent in the early days of the Sedition

23. This is the theme of GERHARDT, supra note 2.
24. See generally GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND
THE INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE AMERICANS (2001).
25. In 1854 Franklin Pierce vetoed a bill granting land to build mental
hospitals, on grounds it would imply a federal power of “public beneficence.”
JAMES MCPHERSON, THE WAR THAT FORGED A NATION 11 (2015).
26. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 61–74 (1993).
27. This is a theme of GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN
WARTIME (2004).

8. 87.4 BRUFF_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1114

7/16/2016 9:53 AM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Act under John Adams, on grounds that the nation was still
adjusting to the emerging role of political parties and the rise
of an organized opposition to the administration.28 In the
cauldron of the Civil War, Lincoln took some actions such as
shutting opposition newspapers that would not be considered
acceptable today.29 Nevertheless, his overall record regarding
civil liberties was surprisingly gentle in the context of a civil
war, involving as it did mostly temporary detentions and few
prosecutions for speech.30 The twentieth century was, however,
a bad one for civil libertarians. Woodrow Wilson triggered
widespread and unjustified prosecution and harassment of
dissenters during and after World War I, a period that included
the first Red Scare.31 In the second Red Scare after World War
II, Senator McCarthy conducted his rampage with only fitful
presidential opposition by Harry Truman and Dwight
Eisenhower.32 There followed the illegal surveillance of
dissident groups during the Vietnam War by Lyndon Johnson
and Richard Nixon.33
As the War on Terror in the early twenty-first century has
demonstrated, modern Presidents are determined to conduct
vigorous surveillance to detect and deter terror threats against
the nation, without showing fine sensibilities about the civil
liberties involved.34 This stance is clearly justifiable to an
extent: every President’s core conception of the faithful
execution duty is that it demands preservation of the nation.
All else is subordinate to this primal imperative. Throughout
our history, however, it has been easy for Presidents to
manipulate public fears of attack in ways that increase their
unchecked discretion.
Moreover, it has become increasingly difficult to monitor
presidential protection of national security. Presidents seem
increasingly determined to look out upon the world without
constraint while shielding their activity from anyone who
would look in upon them, constantly asserting that secrecy
See id. at 29–44.
E.g., id. at 126–34.
See id. at 124–26.
See id. at 180–84, 220–26.
See id. at 323–41.
See id. at 442, 487–500.
See generally HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE
WAR ON TERROR, ch. 7 (2009).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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must attend executive conduct of this “long war.” If the tradeoff
between security and liberty is not to be overly skewed in
executive hands, Congress and the people will need to find
ways to monitor their Presidents and to set enduring limits to
their discretion.35
III. WITH WHOSE HELP?
No President can execute the law unaided. Hence Article II
naturally adopts the passive mood in requiring that the
President take care that the laws be faithfully executed—
normally by the subordinate officers in whom Congress
ordinarily vests the responsibility for administering statutes.36
Again, the direct obligation in the oath is to faithfully execute
the office of the presidency itself in order to preserve the
Constitution. Reading these two provisions together, we see
that the President’s obligation for ordinary administration is
appropriately supervisory in nature rather than personal.37
At once a basic managerial challenge appears. All
principal-agent relationships involve various amounts of
“slack,” that is, divergence between the principal’s desires and
the agent’s actions.38 George Washington kept a close eye on
what his small cabinet was doing, yet even he suffered from the
difficulty of controlling headstrong personalities like Hamilton
and Jefferson.39 As the size of an organization grows, slack
tends to increase, in part due to the principal’s difficulty in
gathering information about what subordinates are doing. Any
35. See generally HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY:
TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2015). Both
this book and UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, are reviewed in Peter L.
Strauss, The President and the Constitution, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1151 (2015).
The accountability theme is also central to both UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note
8, and PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009).
36. For a fine analysis of statutes that grant authority directly to the
President, see Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539
(2005).
37. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007); Kevin M. Stack, The
President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263
(2006).
38. Jamelle C. Sharpe, Judging Congressional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L. REV.
183, 206–07 (2013).
39. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at ch. 2.
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modern President can envy the comparative simplicity of
Washington’s task, considering the size of the modern
executive with its fifteen cabinet departments, myriad other
units, and teeming millions of agents. Harry Truman once
lamented that he spent most of his time trying to get people to
do what they should already be doing.40
The President’s own tasks are threefold: he or she must
select principal subordinates, supervise their activities, and
dismiss them if deficient. Presidents have always had a
daunting number of executive and judicial nominations to
make, and they have always been constrained in making them.
For offices involving senatorial confirmation, the appointments
power is split by the Constitution itself, fundamentally
compromising the prospects for a unitary and coherent
executive establishment by adding an oversight body that may
not accept the President’s preferences. For all presidential
appointments, whether conditioned on confirmation or not,
party politics tugs against presidential preferences. The
patronage wars of the nineteenth century left Presidents
exhausted and frustrated, struggling to control their own
branch of government.41 Creation of the expanding civil service
as an amelioration of patronage has produced a vast executive
bureaucracy that Presidents often see as beyond their control
and inert or even hostile to their policies.
Given these political realities, how do Presidents manage
the executive branch? Knowing the importance of having their
own people in the posts that matter most to them, Presidents
focus their nomination energies in three areas. First is what I
call the “constitutional cabinet,” the four original functions of
the executive that date from 1789: the Departments of State,
Defense, and Treasury, and the Attorney General.42 Even
cabinet departments outside this core receive much less

40. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
501–02, 524 (2010).
41. Examples include James Polk, who remarked that every appointment
produced one ingrate and twenty enemies, UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at
113; James Garfield, who was assassinated by a disappointed office seeker, id. at
188; and our new friend Benjamin Harrison, see GERHARDT, supra note 2, at ch. 9.
42. Some other units such as EPA have attained nearly comparable
importance to modern presidents. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P.
Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of
Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006).
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presidential emphasis in the selection process. It should not
surprise us, then, that departments such as Housing and
Urban Development or Veterans Affairs have attenuated
relationships to the President, and that scandal caused by lax
supervision tends to hover near them.43 Second, ever since
Franklin Roosevelt created the institutional presidency,
Presidents have tried to control their own White House staff,
which in turn tries to control the larger bureaucracy in the
agencies. Ironically, creation of this intermediary layer
between Presidents and department heads creates its own
problems of slack and control, requiring substantial amounts of
presidential time and energy. And third, Presidents focus on
the military leadership, such as the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Civilian control of the military is a basic precept of our
system, but it requires constant attention if it is to remain a
fact and not an aspiration.
Before turning to prevailing modes of presidential
supervision of the executive, I should mention the presence and
limited utility of the power to remove unsatisfactory officers.
The Supreme Court has created a large and somewhat
confused body of caselaw about this power, and scholars have
obsessed over it for eons.44 From the President’s own
standpoint, though, whether the power to remove a particular
officer is constrained or unconstrained as a matter of
constitutional law rarely matters. What does matter, as with
nominations, is the limits imposed by politics. For example,
Presidents Lincoln and Truman had undoubted power to
dismiss their insubordinate generals McClellan and
MacArthur, but both Presidents hesitated and agonized over
the decision due to the political turmoil that would surely
ensue.45 When Barack Obama chose his rival Hillary Clinton
for Secretary of State, he surely knew that her political base
made her all but unremovable.
In practice, the removal power is split between Presidents
and the Senate, and has been at least from the time of Andrew
Jackson. When Jackson decided to destroy the Bank of the
43. For the VA, see Norm Ornstein, Lessons of the VA Scandal, ATLANTIC
(June 5, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/the-bigtakeaways-of-the-va-scandal/372212/ [https://perma.cc/JN3N-YHW2].
44. See generally PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF
POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, ch. 4 (3d ed. 2011).
45. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 139 (Lincoln), 273–75 (Truman).
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United States by removing federal deposits from it, he
discovered that his Treasury Secretary thought that to do so
would be illegal.46 Jackson disagreed, but because the statutory
power to move the deposits was vested in the secretary, the
President could only remove his balky subordinate, which he
did, and seek senatorial confirmation of a more compliant
replacement, which was refused for a time.47 Thus the issue of
what faithful execution means under a particular statute lies
within the executive branch in the first instance, but has the
potential to involve the Senate if a subordinate sufficiently
disagrees to prompt removal and replacement.
This point reveals an important consequence of the
Constitution’s split allocation of the faithful execution duty—
directly to the President for the conduct of his or her own office,
but indirectly in the role of overseeing ordinary administration.
It is a basic precept of Anglo-American law that governmental
authority must remain where allocated unless properly
transferred elsewhere.48 As the episode of Jackson and the
deposits reveals, the indirectness of the statutory part of the
faithful execution duty both buttresses the rule of law and
fosters the transparency of the executive branch.
IV. HOW?
As the episode involving Jackson and the Bank reveals,
supervision of the executive branch is central to how any
President actually discharges the faithful execution duty.
Along with selecting subordinates and (sometimes) removing
them for bad performance, Presidents issue myriad commands
to the bureaucracy. These “executive orders” date from the
Washington administration and have a rich history.49
The Supreme Court set the modern legal framework for
assessing presidential executive orders in the landmark case
that invalidated President Truman’s order seizing the steel
mills to stop a strike during the Korean War.50 Justice Robert
46. See id., 99–101.
47. Id.
48. Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the
Administrative State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1985, 1994–97 (2015).
49. See generally GRAHAM G. DODDS, TAKE UP YOUR PEN: UNILATERAL
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2013).
50. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also

8. 87.4 BRUFF_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

7/16/2016 9:53 AM

PRESIDENT’S FAITHFUL EXECUTION DUTY

1119

Jackson’s magisterial concurring opinion identified three
categories of presidential action: those with express or implied
statutory authority, which are most likely to survive judicial
review; those inconsistent with express or implied statutory
limits, which are least likely to survive; and a middle range of
“twilight” situations where the distribution of power is
uncertain.51 In the Steel Seizure case, a majority of Justices
concluded that a recent statute had denied the President the
authority he sought to exercise. The Court correctly
demonstrated great reluctance to hold that a President could
exercise exclusive power that Congress could not control. Such
a holding threatens fundamentally destabilizing our system of
mostly shared powers.52 As Justice Jackson emphasized, even
emergency powers should be subject to outside control if they
are not to lead to absolutism.
Supreme Court cases upholding exclusive executive power
have been limited to a few matters concerning warmaking and
foreign policy.53 For the most part, Presidents have been loath
to claim exclusive power. Even during the Civil War, Lincoln
submitted fully to congressional control, emphasizing that all
his emergency actions at the outset of the war were within
congressional powers of statutory ratification and calling
successfully for approval to be granted.54 The contrary example
is the disastrous presidency of Andrew Johnson, whose
attempts to conduct Reconstruction without obeying statutes
led to his impeachment and near removal.55
Just as the President’s oath and the faithful execution
clause in Article II of the Constitution refer separately to the
President’s conduct of his or her own office and the supervision
of subordinates who are administering statutes, some
presidential actions are subject to much more mediation within
the bureaucracy than others.56 Especially when an action is

Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER
STORIES, supra note 1, at 233.
51. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–39 (Jackson, J. concurring).
52. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725
(1996).
53. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 44, at chs. 5–6. A recent example is
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
54. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 132–33.
55. Id. at ch. 6.
56. Strauss, supra note 35, at 1161–64.
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directly based on the President’s constitutional powers (such as
disposition of the military under the commander in chief power
or recognition of a foreign government under the foreign policy
powers), an order may pass through the implementing
bureaucracy like a lightning bolt, little hindered by the
medium through which it passes. For most domestic matters,
however, thick layers of bureaucracy and administrative law
mediate presidential actions and can readily impede or
frustrate them.
Consider the nature of rulemaking by the executive
agencies under modern American administrative law. Here a
common complaint is that federal rulemaking has “ossified”
under strict and burdensome requirements for extensive and
rigorous analysis.57 These legal strictures often stem from the
Administrative Procedure Act, to which presidential action is
not subject.58 Executive orders, then, occupy a kind of middle
ground: they are neither statutes nor ordinary delegated
regulations but rather freestanding assertions of whatever
combination of constitutional and statutory authority can be
assembled, with the faithful execution duty as their ultimate
justification. For unlike an ordinary administrative agency,
Presidents can claim responsibility to oversee and harmonize
the “mass of legislation” that empowers the executive branch.59
The twilight zones that are so often present in statutory
interstices
give
Presidents
opportunities
to
infuse
administration with their political values. Three examples of
long-running presidential programs will impart the flavor of
this activity. First, not surprisingly, it was the aggressive
Theodore Roosevelt who initiated a surge in the use of
executive orders that has persisted to the present.60 He made
his strong conservationist values part of the policy of the
federal government by issuing orders shielding large parcels of
the federal lands from development. He had only thin statutory
57. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992). But cf. Mark Seidenfeld, Why
Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70
OHIO ST. L.J. 251 (2009).
58. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
59. This argument, which was made by the dissent in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 702 (1952) (Vinson, J., dissenting), failed
in that case but has more traction when statutory authority is unclear. .
60. DODDS, supra note 49, at 25 fig. 1.
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authority for this practice, but the courts eventually upheld it
on grounds that Congress was aware of it and had acquiesced
in this presidential interpretation of the statutes.61 Second,
after World War II, Presidents, beginning with Harry Truman,
have issued civil rights executive orders promoting equality in
federal employment and contracting.62 They have done so even
in controversial realms such as affirmative action, where
Congress had neither clearly endorsed nor forbidden these
policies. Third, Presidents since Richard Nixon have required
federal regulators to perform cost benefit analyses of proposed
regulations.63 Although these regulatory management
programs have varied somewhat in emphasis and detail, all of
them have tried to conform the bureaucracy to presidential
values about the relation of social costs to new regulations.64
Congress has acquiesced in and funded these programs without
ever endorsing them explicitly.
Controversy about the regulatory management program
reveals that the middle ground occupied by executive orders
intrinsically presents issues about the legality of actions taken
in the name of the President.65 White House intervention in
rulemaking has at times induced agencies to exceed their
statutory powers or to ignore the permissible fact and policy
bases for regulations that are contained in administrative
records.66
Another way that executive orders communicate
presidential values to the executive branch is by setting
priorities for enforcing existing statutes. No President can hope
to fully enforce every statutory requirement that exists on the
books. There are too many laws and too few officers to make
that a realistic prospect. Nor would the American people likely
tolerate an attempt to enforce all laws as written. Consider
what would happen if a city police chief decided to try to
61. Harold H. Bruff, Executive Power and the Public Lands, 76 U. COLO. L.
REV. 503, 509 (2005).
62. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 265–66.
63. Id. at 334.
64. For the evolution of this program, see SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 44, at
486–511.
65. See generally Strauss, supra note 35.
66. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245 (2001); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533 (1989). The problem is a continuing one. See Tummino v.
Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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enforce every traffic law against every violator—that is, to
ticket every speeder, every jaywalker—the system would break
down as processing of minor offenders foreclosed a more
rational and acceptable policy of pursuing the most serious
violators first, such as drunken or reckless drivers.67
This homely example reveals that faithfulness in execution
is not a simple criterion that more law enforcement is better
than less. Instead, the issues are: how much enforcement, of
what kinds, and against whom (recall the who/whom
question).68 The ultimate goal of the best possible execution of
the law is thus a judgment question that is deeply infused with
political values. Resource limits force hard choices.
Appropriations for federal agencies never allow them to do all
that they might, and in modern times funds are often scarce
enough to prompt laments about “hollow government”—an
executive branch with far more responsibilities than
resources.69 Thus Presidents not only may but must prioritize
enforcement if they are to execute their office faithfully.
Inattention is never an adequate exercise of any oversight
responsibility.
Presidential priority-setting for the agencies is often very
difficult for Congress, the courts, and the people to oversee. A
quiet command from the President or someone supposedly
speaking for him can be a signal that is very hard to separate
from the massive noise that the federal bureaucracy generates.
Congressional oversight committees struggle to monitor
presidential activities, but often meet the shield of executive
privilege. Courts are generally very reluctant to review
exercises of enforcement discretion closely, if at all.70 And both
the traditional press and the new journals of the cybersphere
struggle to penetrate government secrecy.
President Barack Obama’s controversial executive order
prioritizing immigration deportation efforts brings together

67. For the disruption potential of extreme adherence to legal requirements,
see Jessica Bulman-Pozen & David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 809 (2015).
68. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise,
124 YALE L.J. 1836 (2015).
69. See generally MARK L. GOLDSTEIN, AMERICA’S HOLLOW GOVERNMENT:
HOW WASHINGTON HAS FAILED THE PEOPLE (1992).
70. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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several of these issues.71 Faced with the presence of many more
undocumented immigrants than existing enforcement
resources could pursue, the President stated his enforcement
priorities clearly for all to see, providing a much greater level of
visibility than attends most law enforcement.72 For example,
he ordered federal agents to seek out dangerous criminals
while leaving law-abiding immigrants free to work or study for
an indefinite period. Obama issued his order only after
extensive legal review within the Justice Department to ensure
that it had implied statutory authority or was at least in the
twilight zone where no statute clearly forbade it. Litigation has
challenged the order, but it rests on priority setting that is
quite unsuited for judicial review.73 As with other executive
orders, the courts may limit themselves to determining
whether the order violates the Constitution or a statute on its
face, without delving much into its administration.74 I think
the order is a lawful exercise of the President’s constitutional
power to determine priorities for faithful execution of the
immigration statutes.75
Presidents have traditionally interpreted the faithful
execution duty to allow or even require that they refuse to
enforce a statute that they regard as unconstitutional.76 Hence
in some cases the correct amount of faithful execution is zero.
In a famous early example, Thomas Jefferson correctly refused
to enforce the Sedition Act of 1798 on the ground that it was a
flagrant violation of free speech as protected by the First
71. Peter M. Shane, Faithful Nonexecution 1–2 (Ohio State Univ. Pub. Law
Working Paper, Paper No. 300, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2637827
[https://perma.cc/D7VB-NNQK].
72. For the order’s particulars and a supporting legal analysis, see Karl R.
Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain
Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EWF2-XWN3].
73. The case is Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, No. 15-674, 2016 WL 207257 (Jan. 19, 2016).
74. Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President’s Statutory Powers, 68
VA. L. REV. 1, 33–41 (1982).
75. See Ming Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in
Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87 (2016); see also Adam B. Cox &
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J.
104 (2015).
76. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 63–64, 174–76.
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Amendment.77 Similar examples have recurred throughout our
history.78 In these cases, Presidents claim that their duty
requires them to confront and contest one or both of the other
branches of government. Such a confrontation is often
necessary if a litigation to resolve the underlying constitutional
question is to be possible. If the oath means what it says,
Presidents must decide what they believe the Constitution
requires of the federal government as a whole. Then the other
branches and We the People can grapple with the issues and
come to some resolution.
V.

SO WHAT?

That is, having the various components of the faithful
execution duty in mind, what effects have this aspect of the
President’s job had on the operation of our government? For
good or ill, Presidents have wide opportunities to take
initiatives that will alter government policies and that will be
difficult for either Congress or the courts to overturn. In this
way, they put their personal stamp on their constitutional
office.
Presidential actions, such as executive orders, have
encountered more political than legal jeopardy. Any order that
receives competent legal review within the executive at the
time of drafting is likely to survive judicial review, and most
do. In the modern age of statutes that began with the twentieth
century, the frequent presence of statutory gaps and
ambiguities invites presidential touchups. Congress finds it
difficult to overturn or modify presidential actions because of
the power of the President’s veto, which almost always allows
him or her to preserve the statutory status quo on which an
order rests. Perhaps ironically (but appropriately), presidential
actions not codified in statute are often more vulnerable to the
differing policies of a successor than to any other threat.79 Thus
Presidents hope that American politics will provide successors
who will continue this contingent part of their legacy.
In our system of three branches exercising partly
Id. at 63.
Shane, supra note 71.
For an example of repeated presidential reversal of predecessors, see
UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 405–06.
77.
78.
79.
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separated powers, presidential action to ensure faithful
execution provides flexibility that is essential to success of the
system as a whole.80 It provides grease in our old machine of
government, adapting its operation to the presidential politics
of the day. In a parliamentary system like those in Great
Britain and Australia, there is less need for such an adaptive
mechanism because a prime minister with a working majority
in the lower house can usually obtain legislation to do what
American Presidents would do by executive order.81 Even when
our Congress is not in its present state of dysfunction,
legislating is difficult enough in the American system to make
it beneficial for Presidents to operate in the interstices to keep
the federal government moving forward.
A given exercise of the faithful execution duty can be
evaluated along a number of axes. Here are some of them.
First, and of prime importance at the time action takes place, is
whether it proves successful in fact and politics. In the longer
term, the durability of particular policies across presidential
administration matters. Retrospective assessments by scholars
including lawyers and historians count (I hope). More
important, though, is the attractiveness of an action to
succeeding Presidents as part of their menu of available policy
choices. At this juncture lies the enduring constitutional impact
(or not) of presidential actions.
American history provides myriad examples of presidential
interpretations of the faithful execution duty that can either
delight or dismay the observer. Lincoln’s Emancipation
Proclamation stands at the apex, forging a new nation shorn of
its gravest defect and enabled to take a new place in the
world.82 More mundane examples of positive exercises of the
duty include many of the conservation and civil rights
executive orders.83 At the nadir sit actions such as Jackson’s
Indian removal, Andrew Johnson’s conduct of Reconstruction,
and Franklin Roosevelt’s wartime internment of Japanese
80. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2,
16–20, 22–23 (2014).
81. “Usually” reflects the possible presence of an upper house not controlled
by the administration, as in Australia.
82. For an analysis of the Proclamation as an exercise of the faithful
execution duty, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Lincoln, the Emancipation
Proclamation, and Executive Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 100 (2013).
83. See, e.g., DODDS, supra note 49, at 198–201, 211–12.
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Americans.84 National remembrance of these worst moments is
essential to prevention of their repetition.
From time to time, a mix of presidential and congressional
activity alters the baseline of the federal government’s role in
American life. The largest shifts have occurred during the Civil
War, in the New Deal, and after World War II. As the baseline
shifts, so do the challenges presented for Presidents, Congress,
and the people. In the twenty-first century, domestic political
settlements dating from the New Deal and foreign policy
settlements reached after the Vietnam War have encountered
fundamental political challenges. In our turbulent political
climate, no clear path to new and stable settlements appears.
The primary current challenge to any President’s effective
conduct of the faithful execution duty lies in managing the
immense and secretive national security bureaucracy that is a
legacy of World War II and the War on Terror. The public
monitoring of executive activity that is so essential to its
legitimacy is difficult at best and has been resisted by recent
Presidents.85 The judgment of the framers of the Constitution
that executive power should be vested in one person is put to
the test by the immensity, complexity, and remoteness of our
current government. Enduring policy will depend on the nature
of information flows both to and from our Presidents. It is
especially important that a flow of accurately determined facts
and well-considered advice reaches the President before action
is taken.86 The President then has an obligation to reveal and
explain his or her actions sufficiently to the people to allow
their meaningful assent to what their government is doing.
And at the end of the day, Presidents must concede the
capacity of statutes and public opinion to limit their actions.87
In closing, I invite the reader to consider what the answers
to my five questions about the faithful execution duty, taken
together, suggest about the current state of the presidency.
84. UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at 93–95 (Jackson), ch. 6 (Johnson),
252–54 (Roosevelt).
85. See Kathleen Clark, “A New Era of Openness”?: Disclosing Intelligence to
Congress Under Obama, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 313 (2010).
86. President Kennedy demonstrated both how not to manage the flow of
advice to a President (the Bay of Pigs) and how to do so very successfully (the
Cuban missile crisis). UNTRODDEN GROUND, supra note 8, at ch. 10.
87. Peter M. Shane, The Presidential Statutory Stretch and the Rule of Law,
87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1231 (2016).
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First, we have seen that the duty’s conception and
implementation change with the personality of each President.
Second, Presidents skew execution to favor supporters and
routinely disfavor dissidents. Third, Presidents hold tenuous
control of their subordinates, focusing their efforts on the most
important officers. Fourth, the use of executive orders pushes
the bureaucracy to implement a President’s political values,
within statutory limits. And fifth, the discretion that the
President necessarily possesses dampens the rigidities in our
system. The portrait of the office that emerges contains
elements of raw power, conflict (both political and
institutional), constraint (both legal and practical), and,
ultimately, great potential to benefit or harm the nation that
all Presidents serve. As I said at the outset, the stakes are high
and Americans must monitor their Presidents to assure that
they discharge the duty faithfully. That is a task for us all, and
it will last as long as our Republic endures.

